Rejoice in Saint Joan of Arc

Saint Joan of Arc (Jeanne la Pucelle): Difference between revisions

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Even as Joan led the French army and its King towards Reims for the sacramental coronation of Charles VII, the French minister Georges La Trémoïlle commenced negotiations with the Burgundian court. The talks advanced enough so that the day after the coronation a formal, fifteen day truce was begun.<ref>See Pernoud, Her Story, p. 72</ref>     
Even as Joan led the French army and its King towards Reims for the sacramental coronation of Charles VII, the French minister Georges La Trémoïlle commenced negotiations with the Burgundian court. The talks advanced enough so that the day after the coronation a formal, fifteen day truce was begun.<ref>See Pernoud, Her Story, p. 72</ref>     


France was Charles' for the taking, especially Paris, but now, not later. Instead, the newly crowned Charles VII preferred the adulation of the people along a slow march towards but not into Paris to actually entering Paris. Charles VII and his ministers had ceded authority over the war to their enemies.     
France was Charles' for the taking, especially Paris, but now, not later. Instead, the newly crowned Charles VII preferred the adulation of the people along a slow march towards but not into Paris to actually retaking Paris. Charles VII and his ministers had ceded authority over the war to their enemies.     


How do we even make sense of this? The English were reeling from Joan's onslaught, the Burgundians were facing the logic of an English alliance that was about to fall apart, and the French army had marched triumphantly to the sacred coronation of the French King. And the French minister proposes Burgundian neutrality? It's hard to see to what advantage La Trémoïlle was leveraging, much less what was the actual situation being leveraged.   
How do we even make sense of this? The English were reeling from Joan's onslaught, the Burgundians were facing the logic of an English alliance that was about to fall apart, and the French army had marched triumphantly to the sacred coronation of the French King. And the French minister proposes Burgundian neutrality? It's hard to see to what advantage La Trémoïlle was leveraging, much less what was the actual situation being leveraged.   
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At best, La Trémoïlle's strategy would isolate the English, perhaps weakening their hold on Normandy. At worst, it would have forced the English to seize Paris, which they had otherwise left to the Burgundians to run under a small English guard. It wouldn't look good to crown Edward VI at Rouen, a city of no cultural significance. Or, just as bad, Burgundian neutrality may have meant access for that coronation to take place at Reims instead of Paris. Who knows, but so long as the English regent of France, the Duke of Bedford, was in charge -- and married to the sister of the Duke of the Burgundy -- the English-Burgundian alliance would hold, especially since the textile factories in Flanders were supplied by English wool.     
At best, La Trémoïlle's strategy would isolate the English, perhaps weakening their hold on Normandy. At worst, it would have forced the English to seize Paris, which they had otherwise left to the Burgundians to run under a small English guard. It wouldn't look good to crown Edward VI at Rouen, a city of no cultural significance. Or, just as bad, Burgundian neutrality may have meant access for that coronation to take place at Reims instead of Paris. Who knows, but so long as the English regent of France, the Duke of Bedford, was in charge -- and married to the sister of the Duke of the Burgundy -- the English-Burgundian alliance would hold, especially since the textile factories in Flanders were supplied by English wool.     


The usual rationale we encounter is that La Trémoïlle and the Archbishop of Reims, Regnault de Chartres, came to resent Joan, through jealousy or whatever, and so worked against her, whether that be to French advantage or not. I don't see it.       
The usual historical explanation that we encounter is that La Trémoïlle and the Archbishop of Reims, Regnault de Chartres, came to resent Joan out of jealousy, or sexism, or something, and so worked against her, whether that be to French advantage or not. I don't see it.       


The Bishop sponsored the inquiry into Joan at Poitiers that recommended to the king that she be sent with an army to Orléans. There she proved herself real, and the entire country was awed and inspired, including one Artur III de Richemont, who, inspired by Joan's miracle at Orléans (or recognizing an opportunity -- same difference), raised an army of a thousand soldiers and marched to the Loire to fight alongside her. As Joan cleared out that river valley, the King and all his ministers without question marched with her to Reims.       
The Bishop sponsored the inquiry into Joan at Poitiers that recommended to the king that she be sent with an army to Orléans. There she proved herself real, and the entire country was awed and amazed, including one Artur III de Richemont, who, inspired by Joan's miracle at Orléans (or recognizing an opportunity -- same difference), raised an army of a thousand soldiers and marched to the Loire to fight alongside her. After Joan cleared out that river valley, the King and all his ministers marched with her to Reims without hesitation or doubt.       


We must recall that the Burgundian state was in part a fief of France and part of the Holy Roman Empire. And, Burgundian Flanders was technically a French fief but in practice was ruled outright by the Duke.<ref>We can think of Flanders as a French "fief" -- land granted to a lord, but whose "vassal," its feudal ruler, was not obligated to serve the French King. By distinction, the Duchy of Burgundy itself and its Duke were both fief and vassal. Flanders was in the 9th century originally part of West Francia (a divided portion of Charlemagne's empire), which became the Kingdom of France.</ref> As they extended their holdings, the dukes of Burgundy, though French themselves, saw themselves more and more lords of an autonomous state. As of 1429, Philip the Good, the Duke of Burgundy of Joan's time, sought to enhance Burgundian power, be that through an English or French King. Didn't matter. By then, the assassination of his father ten years before had become as much an opportunity as a rationale for the war against the Armagnacs, which the alliance with the English conveniently supported.<ref>Certainly the Duke held on to his resentment over the assassination of his father, but it served as an effective instrument of point of negotiation. Burgundy's recognition of Charles VII in the 1435 Treaty of Arras came in exchange for Charles VII's disavowal of participation in and prosecution of those who perpetrated it. More importantly, he got significant land and vassalage concessions, and had to give up very little land himself.</ref>  
We must recall that the Burgundian state was in part a fief of France and part of the Holy Roman Empire. And, Burgundian Flanders was technically a French fief but in practice was ruled outright by the Duke.<ref>We can think of Flanders as a French "fief" -- land granted to a lord, but whose "vassal," its feudal ruler, was not obligated to serve the French King. By distinction, the Duchy of Burgundy itself and its Duke were both fief and vassal. Flanders was in the 9th century originally part of West Francia (a divided portion of Charlemagne's empire), which became the Kingdom of France.</ref> As they extended their holdings, the dukes of Burgundy, though French themselves, saw themselves more and more lords of an autonomous state. Philip the Good, the Duke of Burgundy of Joan's time, had greatly expanded Burgundian Flanders, which neither the English nor the French could claim. It really didn't matter to him whether the King of France was English or French. By 1429, the assassination of the Duke's father ten years before had become as much an opportunity as a rationale for his war against the Armagnacs for which the alliance with the English proved most useful.<ref>Certainly the Duke held on to his resentment over the assassination of his father, but it served as an effective instrument of point of negotiation. Burgundy's recognition of Charles VII in the 1435 Treaty of Arras came in exchange for Charles VII's disavowal of participation in and prosecution of those who perpetrated it. More importantly, he got significant land and vassalage concessions, and had to give up very little land himself.</ref>  


From the point of view of the French court, the Duchy of Burgundy was thoroughly French, so the spat between the Burgundians and the Armagnacs was an internal affair that needed to be resolved while dealing with the English. The problem was that the English were fully intent upon taking France. Had they seized Orlėans and so isolated France to the south, or defeated it outright, the Duchy of Burgundy would have become effectively an English and no longer French vassalage; that is, French in name only. Meanwhile, La Trémoïlle and de Chartres, who together ran Charles VII's court, held on hard to the theory that the Duchy of Burgundy was ultimately French and its alliance with England not sustainable. So it was, but it didn't happen by itself, and far from immediately.  
Where the Armagnac-Burgundian split was originally a fight between French factions, by Joan's time the Armagnacs were "the French" and the Burgundians were "Burgundian." The French court, though, held to the view that the Duchy of Burgundy was French, and thus the factional split was an internal affair, whereas the English problem was external. Yet, the English were fully intent upon taking France. Had they seized Orlėans and so isolated France to the south, or defeated it outright, the Duchy of Burgundy would have become effectively an English and no longer French vassalage; that is, French in name only, and its Flemish and Germanic holdings would have become more and more defining of the Duchy than its French origins. La Trémoïlle and de Chartres, who together ran Charles VII's court, saw the Duchy of Burgundy as French, and its alliance with England thereby not sustainable. So it was, but it didn't happen by itself, and far from immediately, as they thought would magically follow Charles' coronation.


The Maid and her military victories tore into all these cross-ambitions. Joan's insistence upon taking the English and Burgundians on the field of battle was entirely at odds with court machinations that sought some type of negotiated settlement. And having welcomed de Richemont to the fight, she struck right at the heart of La Trémoïlle's -- and Charles VII's -- feudal designs. De Richemont's entry meant war, not compromise. Joan knew it so. She was sent to save "France" and not "feudal France," and so rejected a diplomatic settlement with the Burgundians, which we see in Joan's recollection of her conversation with the reputed mystic Catherine de la Rochelle who wanted to meet the Duke of Burgundy to "make peace":<ref>From the Trial of Rehabilitation, Murray, p. 53</ref>    <blockquote>I told her it seemed to me that peace would be found only at the end of the lance.  </blockquote>While undermined by the French court in her continued war against the English and the Burgundians, Joan was right. After her death in 1431, her compatriot warriors, the Duc d'Alençon, La Hire<ref>He was captured by the Burgundians in 1430 but escaped or was ransomed soon after.</ref>, Jean Dunois and, of course, Artur de Richemont, carried on the fight, raiding northern France, liberating towns, raising alarms, and menacing English and Burgundian holds. The raids challenged the alliance and opened the opportunity for the Congress of Arras, engineered by de Richemont himself, which brought in all parties, French, Burgundian, and English. Absent that pressure of Joan-style warfare, there was no need for the English and the Burgundians to enter into the Congress of Arras in the first place.   
Joan and her military victories tore into all these cross-ambitions. Her insistence upon taking the English and Burgundians on the field was entirely at odds with court machinations that sought negotiated settlements. For Joan, as long as the Burgundians were allied with the English they were equally the enemy. She told the Rouen court,<ref>Murray, p. 19</ref>    <blockquote>


Historians have recognized this aspect of Joan's influence upon events, especially in the re-militarization of France under de Richemont after he expelled La Trémoïlle from the French court. De Richemont himself was a piece of work. Arriving with his soldiers to Jargeau was his first ploy to regain power as Constable of France. By welcoming him, and forcing the general, d'Alençons, to accept his presence, it was Joan who put into place the dynamics that would lead to the reconciliation of Burgundy with France four years after her death. Yet a long while before the defeat of the English, it was a key turning point, if not as important as Orléans and the crowning of Charles at Reims, the contingent events that allowed all the rest to happen.     
As soon as I knew that my Voices were for the King of France, I loved the Burgundians no more. The Burgundians will have war unless they do what they ought; I know it by my Voice.    </blockquote>


La Trémoïlle's and de Richemont's mutual history and animosities were large. Both men were captured at Agincourt, so who knows what went on there. All we know is that La Trémoïlle was released right away, while de Richemont, who was injured in the battle, was not, and had to wait five years. Ultimately, de Richemont returned to the French court, and there helped La Trémoïlle in 1427 to oust the court Minister, Pierre de Giac.<ref>See [https://www.britannica.com/biography/Georges-de-La-Tremoille?utm_source=chatgpt.com Georges de La Trémoille | Military Commander, Courtier, Diplomat | Britannica] which states that after kidnapping and drowning Giac, La Trémoïlle married the guy's widow.</ref> La Trémoïlle then engineered de Richemont's dismissal, who then turned briefly to the English, for which he was so vilified by the French.<ref>De Richemont, Artur III, was from Brittany, which had an identity distinct from England and France, although it was geographically and thereby more largely tied to France. The name "Richemont" was a francophone version of the English "Richmond," so even in the name we can see the crossed identities.</ref> In 1433, de Richemont took revenge upon La Trémoïlle, had him kidnapped and ransomed for a fee and a pledge to stay out of the Court. But there's more: turns out that La Trémoïlle had previously spent a couple years serving the Burgundians before rejoining the Armagnacs and Dauphin Charles in 1413, two years before the English invasion.  
Having welcomed de Richemont to the fight, Joan struck at the heart of La Trémoïlle's -- and Charles VII's -- feudal designs. De Richemont's entry meant war, not compromise. Joan knew it so. She was sent to save "France" and not "feudal France," and so rejected a diplomatic settlement with the Burgundians, which we see in her recollection of a conversation with the reputed mystic Catherine de la Rochelle, who wanted to meet the Duke of Burgundy to "make peace":<ref>From the Trial of Rehabilitation, Murray, p. 53</ref>   <blockquote>I told her it seemed to me that peace would be found only at the end of the lance.   </blockquote>While undermined by the French court in her continued war against the English and the Burgundians, Joan was right. After her death in 1431, her compatriot warriors, the Duc d'Alençon, La Hire<ref>He was captured by the Burgundians in 1430 but escaped or was ransomed soon after.</ref>, Jean Dunois and, of course, Artur de Richemont, carried on the fight, raiding northern France, liberating towns, raising alarms, and menacing English and Burgundian holds. The raids challenged the alliance and opened the opportunity for the Congress of Arras that realigned the Burgundians to the French, and which was engineered by de Richemont himself. Absent the pressure of warfare that Joan brought on, there was no need for the English and the Burgundians to enter into the Congress of Arras in the first place.  


While La Trémoïlle served under him, Charles VII himself refused to allow de Richemont's presence at the coronation, which was by custom his due, saying, according to a Chronicler, that<ref>Pernoud, Her Story, p. 67, quoting from the Chronicle of Guillaume Gruel.</ref>  <blockquote>he would rather never be crowned than have my lord [de Richemont] in attendance.  </blockquote>Joan, the chronicler reported, was angry at de Richemont's exclusion.     
Historians have recognized this aspect of Joan's influence upon events, especially in the re-militarization of France under de Richemont after he expelled La Trémoïlle from the French court. Arriving with his soldiers to Jargeau was his first ploy to regain power as Constable of France. By welcoming him, and forcing the general, d'Alençons, to accept his presence, it was Joan who put into place the dynamics that would lead to the reconciliation of Burgundy with France four years after her death. Yet long before the final defeat of the English, it was a key turning point, if not as important as Orléans and the crowning of Charles at Reims, the contingent events that allowed all the rest to happen.     


Or, perhaps, La Trémoïlle and Regnaud de Chartres were merely practicing standard statecraft. Negotiation was as much a part of Medieval warfare as swords and crossbows. For example, after the English victory at the "Battle of Herrings" during the siege of Orléans, the city's leadership appealed to the Duke of Burgundy to submit itself to him in order to secure the city's neutrality in exchange for relief from the English. Understanding that the Duke of Orléans was being held in England, that Orléans was the center of Armagnac resistance to the Burgundians. The Armagnac movement was named for the the Count of Armagnac, the father-in-law of Louis I, the Duke of Orléans whom John the Fearless, Duke of Burgundy, murdered in 1407. Any questions as to the desperation felt in Orléans (which has been questioned by historians) should be replaced by wonder at the desperation of the city in offering to surrender to the son of the Duke of Burgundy who had murdered the father of the current Duke of Orléans. Burgundy, of course, was all for it, but the idea was vetoed by the larger Duke, the Englishman Bedford, who smelled victory over France, and who crowed,<ref>Pernoud, Her Story, p. 13</ref>  <blockquote>I would be mighty angry to cut down the bushes so that someone else could get the little birds from the branches! </blockquote>Then the Maid got in the way of it all, which makes the French diplomatic maneuvering leading up to and after the Coronation of Charles glaringly odd: Bedford was absolutely right: Orléans gone, France gone, so Orléans saved, France saved, and even more importantly, Charles crowned at Reims, France really saved. Something else was going on, and all I can see is that a personal spat got between God's plan for France and what it chose.     
La Trémoïlle's and de Richemont's mutual history and animosities were large. Both men were a piece of work. As each were captured at Agincourt, who knows what went on there. La Trémoïlle was released right away, while de Richemont, who was injured in the battle, was not, and had to wait five years for his ransom. Ultimately, de Richemont returned to the French court, and there helped La Trémoïlle in 1427 to oust the court Minister, Pierre de Giac.<ref>See [https://www.britannica.com/biography/Georges-de-La-Tremoille?utm_source=chatgpt.com Georges de La Trémoille | Military Commander, Courtier, Diplomat | Britannica] which states that after kidnapping and drowning Giac, La Trémoïlle married the guy's widow.</ref> La Trémoïlle then engineered de Richemont's dismissal, who then turned briefly to the English, for which he was so vilified by the French.<ref>De Richemont, Artur III, was from Brittany, which had an identity distinct from England and France, although it was geographically and thereby more largely tied to France. The name "Richemont" was a francophone version of the English "Richmond," so even in the name we can see the crossed identities.</ref> In 1433, de Richemont took revenge upon La Trémoïlle, and had him kidnapped and ransomed with the pledge to stay out of the French Court. But there's more: turns out that La Trémoïlle had previously spent a couple years serving the Burgundians before rejoining the Armagnacs and Dauphin Charles in 1413, two years before the English invasion. As for de Richemont, after his release from the English, he supported the Treaty of Troyes, which yielded French royal succession to the English king. The Duke of Burgundy knew these characters well enough to offer de Richemont, in exchange for his loyalty, lands that belonged to  La Trémoïlle.     


A final possibility, which brings us into the ever dubious realm of "psychohistory"<ref>It was actually a thing in the 1970s, and, per its Wikipedia page, persists. (Find it yourself.)</ref>, which tries to understand the past by putting it on the sofa and asking about its darkest thoughts. At first it seems reasonable that much of the capitulation to the Burgundians that Charles VII had authorized was due to his deep sense of guilt over the "murder on the bridge" of John the Fearless. The King held, the theory goes, lingering baggage from the assassination of John the Fearless, the Duke of Burgundy's father, <ref>Recalling that it was retribution for the 1407 assassination of Charles' uncle, the Duke of Orléans (and brother of Charles VI and whose heir was captured by the English in 1415 at Agincourt).</ref> The assassination launched the Armagnanc-Burgundian civil war<ref>The "war" may be understood to have started with the 1407 assassination of the Duke of Orléans. Following John the Fearless' murder, it turned into open warfare.</ref> and opened the door for the English, who were already on the move in northern France, to sign the Treaty of Troyes<ref>Making Henry V of England heir to the French throne.</ref> with Charles's weak and troubled father, Charles VI. So the history weighed upon the new King, we are told. If so, we must imagine a newly crowned and victorious King waking up the next day thinking himself unworthy of it all. It's not just doubtful, its nonsensical, much less unprovable. We know only from Joan what the "sign" was that she showed Charles back at Chinon, that it was a golden crown brought by angels. I'm thinking survivor guilt gets washed away pretty quickly by God's agents delivering an entire country to you.      
La Trémoïlle held sway with Charles VII, who refused to allow de Richemont's presence at his coronation, which was by custom de Richemont's due, saying, according to a Chronicler, that<ref>Pernoud, Her Story, p. 67, quoting from the Chronicle of Guillaume Gruel.</ref> <blockquote>he would rather never be crowned than have my lord [de Richemont] in attendance. </blockquote>Joan, the chronicler reported, was angry at de Richemont's exclusion. But Joan didn't care about palace back stories. She just wanted to win the war.    


We do know that La Trémoïlle, and, thus, with Charles' approval at some level, aimed for Burgundian neutrality, and that the Duke of Burgundy had no such intention and instead took advantage of the French self-deception in order to reinforce his position with the English -- who took advantage of the reaffirmed alliance with the Burgundians, to reinforce Paris with 1,000 troops.<ref>See Pernoud, Her Story, p. 73</ref>         
Or, perhaps La Trémoïlle and the Archbishop Regnaud de Chartres were merely practicing standard statecraft. Negotiation was as much a part of Medieval warfare as swords and crossbows. For example, after the English victory at the "Battle of Herrings" during the siege of Orléans, the city's leadership appealed to the Duke of Burgundy to submit itself to him in order to secure the city's neutrality in exchange for relief from the English. Understanding that the Duke of Orléans was being held in England, that Orléans was the center of Armagnac resistance to the Burgundians. The Armagnac movement was named for the the Count of Armagnac, the father-in-law of Louis I, the Duke of Orléans whom John the Fearless, Duke of Burgundy, murdered in 1407. Any questions as to the desperation felt in Orléans (which has been questioned by historians) should be replaced by wonder at the desperation of the city in offering to surrender to the son of the Duke of Burgundy who had murdered the father of the current Duke of Orléans. Burgundy, of course, was all for it, but the idea was vetoed by the larger Duke, the Englishman Bedford, who smelled victory over France, and who crowed,<ref>Pernoud, Her Story, p. 13</ref>  <blockquote>I would be mighty angry to cut down the bushes so that someone else could get the little birds from the branches! </blockquote>Then the Maid got in the way of it all, which makes the French diplomatic maneuvering leading up to and after the Coronation of Charles so glaringly odd: Bedford was absolutely right: Orléans gone, France gone, so Orléans saved, France saved, and even more importantly, Charles crowned at Reims, France truly saved. Something else was going on, and all I can see is that a personal spat got between God's plan for France and what its leadership chose to do.   
 
A final possibility, which brings us into the ever dubious realm of "psychohistory"<ref>It was actually a thing in the 1970s, and, per its Wikipedia page, persists. (Find it yourself.)</ref>, which tries to understand the past by putting it on the sofa and asking about its darkest thoughts. At first it seems reasonable that much of the capitulation to the Burgundians that Charles VII had authorized was due to his deep sense of guilt over the "murder on the bridge" of John the Fearless. The King held, the theory goes, lingering baggage from the assassination of the Duke. <ref>Recalling that it was retribution for the 1407 assassination of Charles' uncle, the Duke of Orléans (and brother of Charles VI and whose heir was captured by the English in 1415 at Agincourt).</ref> The assassination launched the Armagnanc-Burgundian civil war<ref>The "war" may be understood to have started with the 1407 assassination of the Duke of Orléans. Following John the Fearless' murder, it turned into open warfare.</ref> and opened the door for the English, who were already on the move in northern France, to sign the Treaty of Troyes<ref>Making Henry V of England heir to the French throne.</ref> with Charles's weak and troubled father, Charles VI. So the history weighed upon the new King, we are told. If so, we must imagine a newly crowned and victorious King waking up the next day thinking himself unworthy of it all. It's not just doubtful, its nonsensical, much less unprovable. We know only from Joan what the "sign" was that she showed Charles back at Chinon, that it was a golden crown brought by angels. I'm thinking survivor guilt gets washed away pretty quickly by God's agents delivering an entire country to you.       
 
We do know that La Trémoïlle, and, thus, with Charles' approval at some level, aimed for Burgundian neutrality, and that the Duke of Burgundy had no such intention and instead took advantage of the French self-deception in order to reinforce his position with the English -- who took advantage of the reaffirmed alliance with the Burgundians to reinforce Paris with 1,000 troops.<ref>See Pernoud, Her Story, p. 73</ref>         


Joan, meanwhile, the day of the Coronation, affirmed the King's peace overtures to Burgundy, only with capitulation of any French lands he held, and with the advice that he'd do better to wage war against the "Saracens," which at that time would mean the Ottomans, than against the French:     
Joan, meanwhile, the day of the Coronation, affirmed the King's peace overtures to Burgundy, only with capitulation of any French lands he held, and with the advice that he'd do better to wage war against the "Saracens," which at that time would mean the Ottomans, than against the French:     
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